COU 4: Nuclear Weapons are Scary, Part 2

Here is a version of the model developed in COU 2 depicting the choice of the leaders of two nuclear-armed nations to use or not use nuclear weapons during a war.

Part 1: Mutual Restraint

Prompt 1A

Is the profile in which both leaders refrain from nuclear strikes a Nash Equilibrium?

Prompt 1B

If you answered “yes” to Prompt 1A, explain why refraining is a best response for each of the two leaders to the expectation that the other leader will refrain. If you answered “no” to Prompt 1A, explain why refraining is not a best response for at least one of the two leaders to the expectation that the other leader will refrain.

Part 2: Limited Nuclear War

Prompt 2A

Is the profile in which both leaders order limited nuclear strikes a Nash Equilibrium?

Prompt 2B

If you answered “yes” to Prompt 1A, explain why a limited strike is a best response for each of the two leaders to the expectation that the other leader will order a limited strike. If you answered “no” to Prompt 1A, explain why a limited strike is not a best response for at least one of the two leaders to the expectation that the other leader will order a limited strike.

Part 3: Unlimited Nuclear War

Prompt 3A

Is the profile in which both leaders order massive nuclear strikes a Nash Equilibrium?

Prompt 3B

If you answered “yes” to Prompt 1A, explain why a massive strike is a best response for each of the two leaders to the expectation that the other leader will order a massive strike. If you answered “no” to Prompt 1A, explain why a massive strike is not a best response for at least one of the two leaders to the expectation that the other leader will order a massive strike.

Rubric

This COU consists of three parts (“Mutual Restraint”, “Limited Nuclear War”, etc.) with a pair of prompts for each part.

The first prompt in each pair asks whether a given profile is a Nash Equilibrium. The answer to that prompt is either “yes” or “no”. An answer gets 1 point if it is correct and 0 points otherwise.

The second prompt in each pair asks for an explanation for the answer to the first prompt. It is worth 3 points. If the answer to the first prompt in the pair is incorrect, the answer to the second prompt gets 0 points. If the answer to the first prompt is correct, the answer to the second prompt gets 3 points if it explains the answer to the first prompt with correct statements of the relevant highest possible utility levels and the relevant utility levels. No partial credit is available.