COU 1: Power In Numbers

Recall that one way a repressive regime can fail is through a “failure of credibility”. This occurs when large numbers of persons in the population it represses cease to believe that they will be punished if they transgress the regime’s rules. This can lead to simultaneous transgression of those rules by more persons than the regime has the resources to punish. When large numbers of persons transgress the rules all at once, but only a fraction of them get punished for it, more persons believe that they too can get away with transgressing the rules, which in turn can lead to more un-punished transgressions, which in turn can lead to more persons transgressing, and so on and so on until everyone is flaunting the regime’s demands and no one believes that the regime will back up its threats.

This is one of the reasons that resistance organizers use mass protest as a tactic when attempting to weaken repressive regimes. One purpose of a mass protest against a repressive regime is to get a very large number of persons out in the street flaunting the regime’s restrictions all at once, acting as though they have no fear the regime’s violence. If the number of protesters is large enough, the regime will be able to beat, imprison and kill only a fraction of them. The other fraction will, publicly and demonstrably, have violated the regime’s demands and gotten away with it. This, organizers hope, will lead to further fearless and public transgressions by more people, triggering a cascade that culminates in a complete collapse in the credibility of the regime’s threats to punish transgressors.

Notice that for a mass protest to substantially undermine a regime’s credibility in this way, the number of people who participate in the protest is crucial. A protest of too few persons is worse than no protest at all! If there are too few protesters, the regime will easily be able to punish every single one, thus reinforcing the impression that any transgression by any member of the population will be punished. Thus if organizers hope to demonstrate that the repressive regime is not omnipotent, some protesters must go unpunished. And thus the number of persons who participate in the protest must be substantially larger than the number of thugs sent out to beat, arrest and kill protesters.

This means that persons in a population targeted by a repressive regime, when they are considering whether to participate in a protest, are in an interaction with one another that can entail strategic interdependence.

In the paragraphs of the lesson leading up to this COU, we illustrated strategic interdependence using a model in which an organizer and a regime leader each choose between one of two actions: The organizer chooses to protest or not protest and the regime leader chooses to order overwhelming violence in response to any protest or to order limited violence in response to any protest.

As we depicted it, this interaction is one of strategic interdependence because each of the actor’s preferences over her actions depend on her expectations about the action the other actor will take. We depicted the dependence of each actor’s preferences on her expectations as follows:

Organizer’s Expectations about Regime’s Response to Protest	Organizer’s Preferences
Overwhelming violence	Organizer prefers to not protest instead of protest
Limited violence	Organizer prefers to protest instead of not protest

Regime Leader’s Expectation about the Organizer’s Action	Regime Leaders’s Preferences
Will stage a protest	Leader prefers to order limited violence instead of overwhelming violence
Will not stage a protest	Leader prefers to order overwhelming violence instead of limited violence

Further, we explained how this strategic interdependence might arise by telling a story about why the effects of each person’s action on their objectives might change in response to the action of the other person. For instance, we explained why protest might deepen fear of the regime if it is met by overwhelming violence but weaken fear of the regime if it is met by limited violence; And we explained that ordering overwhelming violence might weaken the regime’s support from elites if protest occurs but strengthen support from elites if no protest occurs.

In this COU, you will build and discuss a similar model that depicts the strategic interdependence that arises between persons in a population targeted by a repressive regime when those persons each decide whether to participate in a street protest against the regime. The basic idea you will depict in the model is that the effect of one person participating in the protest on that person’s objectives depends on whether other persons also participate the protest. If a person joins a protest and very few others join, the person and her fellow protesters will all be punished and the regime will be strengthened. On the other hand if a person joins a protest and many others also join, the protesters will outnumber the thugs, and thus only a fraction of them will be punished and the regime will be weakened.

The model you build will depict these ideas in the simplest possible way. It will depict an interaction between just two persons, called “Person A” and “Person B”. Each of these persons must choose between one of two actions: to participate in a protest or to not participate in a protest. For each person, participating will serve her goals if the other person participates, and will not serve her goals if the other person does not participate.

Thus, although your model will only have two persons, it will depict the strategic interdependence that any number of persons may face when they each decide whether to participate in a protest. Specifically, participating in the protest will further each person’s goals only if a sufficiently large number of the other persons also participate.

Prompt 1

Write two tables modeled on the ones used in the lesson to depict the interaction between the organizer and the regime leader. One of the two tables must depict how Person A’s preferences over her available actions (again, to participate or to not participate in a protest) depend on her expectations about the action Person B will choose. The other must depict how Person B’s preferences over his available actions (again, to participate or to not participate in a protest) depend on his expectations about the action Person A will choose. The tables you write should depict the basic idea that for each of these two persons, participating in protest serves her goals if the other persons also participates, and does not serve her goals if the other person does not participate.

As you formulate the labels of the columns of the table, keep in mind the subtle but critical feature of the definition of strategic interdependence: Strategic interdependence is about expectations. More precisely, an interaction between two or more actors entails strategic interdependence when each of their preferences over their available actions depend on their expectations about the actions the other actors will take.

Prompt 2

In one-half to one page of double spaced text, explain what the model you wrote in response Prompt 1 depicts, and explain why each person’s preferences over her available action depend on her expectations about the action the other actor will take. The story you tell must be comprehensible to a person who is not taking this class, and thus has not read any of this material! Thus it must explain why and how the number of persons who participate in a protest can affect the achievement of the protesters’ objectives, AND how the relationship between the number of protesters and the objectives of the protesters causes persons deciding whether to participate in a protest to be strategically interdependent on one another in the way your model depicts.

Prompt 3

Just after stating the definition of strategic interdependence, the Lesson discussed the subtle fact that strategic interdependence is about expectations. Specifically, a group of persons are strategically interdependent when each person’s preferences over her available actions depend on her expectations about the actions the other persons in the group will take. Thus, strategic interdependence is relevant only when each person must choose which action to take when she is not certain about the actions the other persons will take. And because of this, the timing with which persons choose their actions is crucial for creating strategic interdependence. For instance, if the effect of a person’s actions on her goals depend on the actions chosen by other persons, and that person can delay choosing her action until those other persons have chosen their actions, then she can make her choice knowing what actions those other persons have taken.

Imagine you are an organizer leading a resistance campaign that you hope will bring down a repressive regime. Imagine you are trying to recruit persons to participate in a street protest as part of the campaign. You know that the protest will weaken the regime if a large number of persons participate, and will strengthen the regime if a small number participate. You know that if you recruit a large number of persons to participate, a fraction of them will be imprisoned, beaten or killed. You know that if you recruit a small number, all of them will be imprisoned, beaten or killed. Finally, you know that this is a situation in which the persons you hope to recruit to participate are strategically interdependent on one another. As in the model you built above, the effect of each person’s participation in the protest on her goals will depend on whether or not a sufficient number of other persons participate.

Thus you are concerned with the timing of persons’ decisions to join the protest. If you can make it so that at least some persons do not have to decide whether to participate in the protest until after a substantial number of other persons have committed to participate or not participate, then you can at least eliminate a substantial amount of uncertainty for the persons you’re trying to recruit. Suppose you’re motivated to eliminate uncertainty in this way in part by compassion. You know that persons will be stressed by having to choose whether to participate without knowing how many others will participate. Suppose that you also hope that by somehow by altering the timing of persons’ decisions, you are more likely to recruit the large number of participants you need to succeed.

In no more than one page of double-spaced text: (a) Describe a tactic you would use as part of recruiting for, organizing and executing the protest that would alter the timing of person’s decisions to participate so that many persons do not have to decide whether to participate until after many other persons have either joined in or refused. (b) Explain why you think your tactic would eliminate the relevant uncertainty for at least some potential recruits. (c) Describe the limitations of what your tactic can achieve in reducing the relevant uncertainty – i.e. why and to what extent your strategy cannot eliminate uncertainty for at least some persons about how many people will participate in the protest at the moment they choose whether to participate.

Note that the key thing we are assessing in this answer is whether you correctly understand the nature of the uncertainty entailed in strategic interdependence! So make sure you understand and can express in words the nature of that uncertainty before formulating your answer. Also note that eliminating uncertainty is not the same thing as changing a person’s expectations. For instance, convincing a person that it is likely that many other persons will participate does not give that person knowledge of how many people will participate. As you know from Lesson 4, a person who thinks that it is likely that a large number of other persons will participate is still uncertain about how many persons will participate.

Prompt 4

When a group of persons faces strategic interdependence, each person’s expectations about what the other persons will do can have a substantial effect on her incentives. Think for instance, of a group of persons who are each choosing whether to participate in a protest, as in the model you built above. If one of those persons expects that it is very likely that a large number of the other persons will join the protest, then she will be more inclined to join herself. On the other hand, if she expects that it is very unlikely that a large number of the other persons will join, then she will be less inclined to join.

Thus, in political interactions that entail strategic interdependence, we often see leaders try to influence persons’ expectations about what other persons will do. Leaders in these interactions understand that the choices people make will be driven by their expectations about the behavior of others. Thus they try to shift these expectations in ways that will shift incentives.

A nice example of a leader’s attempt to influence expectations in a situation of strategic interdependence comes from the 1962 Greenwood resistance campaign. During that campaign, Sam Block and other protest organizers relied on black churches in Greenwood for recruiting, training and motivating protesters. When they wanted to stage a protest, they would ask one of Greenwood’s black ministers if they could hold a meeting at his church to organize the protest. If the minister consented, the organizers would put out a call to black residents of Greenwood to come to the meeting at that minister’s church. At the meeting, organizers would exhort those who showed up to join them in the upcoming protest and lead the group in song to bind them together in preparation for the violence they would face as protesters. They would also share the basic information attendees needed to participate – i.e. where to show up for the protest, when to show up, and what to do at the protest.

White terrorists understood that black churches were essential resources for the resistance, and so they regularly carried out night-time drive-by shootings and bombings of the homes of ministers and congregants of the churches that hosted organizing meetings. Their goal was to intimidate ministers and congregants in hopes that they would not allow their churches to be used for organizing. The violence was partially effective. Many black ministers refused to allow organizers to use their churches for meetings out of fear that it would get them or their congregants killed, and out of fear that some congregants might stop attending a church that was hosting meetings. Thus organizers struggled to persuade ministers to allow their churches to be used for meetings.

The following is transcript of a speech given by Dick Gregory (a Chicago-based black comedian who worked as an organizer in Greenwood in 1962 and 1963) at an organizing meeting held at a black church in Greenwood in 1963.¹ Gregory’s speech was made in a Methodist church. In it, Gregory calls out the ministers of Greenwood’s Baptist churches for refusing to allow organizers to hold meetings at their churches. “[E]ven little kids are in the struggle”, he says, “and not one Baptist church has opened up its doors in this area”:

I’m a Baptist by choice, but if I had to spend much time in this area, they’d have to force me to be a Baptist because even little kids are in the struggle and not one Baptist church has opened up its doors in this area. [Loud and sustained applause.]…Any good Baptists in the house? [People murmur assent] When you go to church Sunday [pause] look him [i.e. the minister] in the face [pause], then pray for him [long pause], then walk out!!! [The house comes down with applause and laughter.] If you won’t even try to get some dignity, God can’t use you. They so worried about their church, give ’em their church! Give it to ’em empty! If you have to pray in the street, it’s better than worshipping with a man who is less than a man! [The clapping, laughing and footstomping continue for a long time.]

Imagine that Gregory hoped that the contents of his speech and the crowd’s reaction to it would be relayed to the area’s Baptist ministers. Imagine, moreover, that this would have the effect of changing those ministers expectations about the actions their congregants would take if they continued to refuse to allow their churches to be used for organizing meetings. (If you’re mystified by this, read the speech again: What is Gregory suggesting that Baptists should do if their ministers continue to refuse to contribute to the movement?)

In one-half to one page of double spaced text, explain how ministers’ expectations about how their congregants would react to them permitting their churches to be used for organizing meetings might have affected their incentives to either consent to or refuse organizers’ requests to hold meetings at their churches. Further, explain how Gregory’s speech might have altered those expectations, and why, if the speech was successful, it might have caused some Baptist ministers to decide to allow their churches to be used for meetings.

Rubric

Prompt 1

A correct answer has all the following features:

It amounts to two tables.
Each table has two columns.
Each table depicts the preferences of one of the two persons (Person A or Person B) conditional on her expectation about the action the other person will take.
One column of each table must list the possible expectations the Person depicted by that table can have about the actions the other person will take.
The other column of each table must state the preference ordering the person depicted by that table will have over her own actions given the expectation described in the relevant row about the action the other person will take.

An answer that meets all the above criteria gets two points. An answer that meets criteria (a) (b) but misses ONLY ONE of (d) or (e) gets one point. Anything else gets zero points.

Prompt 2

A successful answer does all of the following, in a way comprehensible to a person not taking this class:

It must describe what the model depicts – i.e. two persons each deciding whether or not to participate in a protest.
The description must state (using whatever words) that each person depicted by the model prefers to participate in the protest if they expect the other person to participate, and prefers to not participate in the protest if they expect the other person to not participate.
It must give reasons why persons who are deciding whether to participate in a protest might have preferences over whether or not to participate that depend on their expectations about what other potential participants will do as described in b. These reasons must be understandable to a person who is not taking this course. They may be, but do not have to be, the reasons described in the lesson.
It must be sufficiently free of errors of spelling, grammar and usage as to be readily and easily comprehensible.
If hand written, it must be immediately and easily legible.

An answer gets…

Four points…: if it meets all of the above criteria.
Two points…: if it meets criteria (a), (d) and (e) and meets either criterion (b) or (c) but not both.
One point…: if it meets criteria (a), (d) and (e) and meets neither criterion (b) nor (c).
Zero points…: if it misses any of criteria (a), (d) or (e).

Prompt 3

A successful answer does all of the following:

Describes a tactic one could employ as a protest organizer and presents that tactic as altering the timing of persons’ decisions about whether to participate in a protest so that at least some of those persons make their decision after others have already decided whether to participate.
Explains how that tactic would eliminate some uncertainty for some persons about how many people will participate in the protest at the time those persons must choose whether to participate.
Describes limitations in the extent to which the tactic can eliminate uncertainty. These limitations can be in terms of the number of persons for whom uncertainty can be reduced, the extent to which anyone’s uncertainty can be reduced or both.
It must be sufficiently free of errors of spelling, grammar and usage as to be readily and easily comprehensible.
If hand written, it must be immediately and easily legible.

An answer gets…

Four points…: if it meets all of the above criteria.
Two points…: if it meets criteria (a), (d) and (e) and meets either criterion (b) or (c) but not both.
One point…: if it meets criteria (a), (d) and (e) and meets neither criterion (b) nor (c).
Zero points…: if it misses any of criteria (a), (d) or (e).

Prompt 4

A successful answer does all of the following:

Explains how ministers’ expectations about how their congregants would react to them permitting or not permitting organizers to hold meetings in their churches would affect their incentives to permit or not permit organizers to hold meetings in their churches.
Explains how Gregory’s speech might have altered the expectations described in (a).
Explains why, if Gregory’s speech was successful, it might have altered those expectations and caused Baptist ministers to allow their churches to be used for meetings.
It must be sufficiently free of errors of spelling, grammar and usage as to be readily and easily comprehensible.
If hand written, it must be immediately and easily legible.

An answer gets…

Four points…: if it meets all of the above criteria.
Two points…: if it meets criteria (a), (d) and (e) and meets either criterion (b) or (c) but not both.
One point…: if it meets criteria (a), (d) and (e) and meets neither criterion (b) nor (c).
Zero points…: if it misses any of criteria (a), (d) or (e).

References

Payne, Charles M. 2007. I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle. University of California Press.

Footnotes

Transcript by historian Charles M. Payne (2007, 198)↩︎